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The Colorado Judiciary Committee
By PHILIP S. VAN CISF*
The Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association at its
session in Colorado Springs, October 20, 1945, voted to create a Judiciary Committee and the writer was appointed chairman, with instructions to select his own committee. Before doing so I wish to outline for
the bench and bar some of the problems involved, and ask for all possible
suggestions as to the scope of our work, what we should attempt to do..
and what members of the bar will volunteer to help in the undertaking.
Our aim should be to make the courts of Colorado the model for all
other states. To do so, we will have to travel a real road, as the State of
Missouri, in 1940 and 1945, adopted amendments to its constitution
which are far reaching and inspiring. Other states have adopted some
reforms, and the Colorado Bar Association now starts the work in this
state.
The outline of the task shapes up somewhat as follows:
I. Non-partisan selection of able jurists, adequate pay, guaranty
of tenure in office for the efficient and prompt elimination of those who
are unfit because of temperament, physical or mental disability (in past
years we have had senile judges both on the supreme and district courts),
retirement on adequate pensions at a fixed age and after service for a
sufficient length of time to merit it.
2. An analysis of each court and each judge in the state, from the
Supreme Court to the justice court, with the data as to the work accomplished, and pay (including travel) , of each judge, and the statistics in
each court, as to volume of work, number of employees, good and bad
features, etc.
3. An integrated court system, with possible changes in some and
abolition of others, and an administrative department to insure uniform
business methods in the judicial system.
4. The selection of a non-partisan judiciary committee, composed
of at least one member from each judicial district, with an executive
committee of five, a chairman and sub-committee in each judicial district
and county.
5. Drafting of proposed constitutional amendments and statutes.
*Of the Denver bar.
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6. After the spade work is done, submitting the drafts to the press,
labor, industry, educators and the public to get their criticisms and suggestions before making the final plan.
7. Enlisting the support of the members of the legislature before
they meet, to insure the speedy passage of the plan when ready for
adoption.
8. Raising sufficient funds for the work--at least $15,000, and
probably more-and employing a full-time stenographer and a parttime lawyer secretary, office and telephone.
I. INTEGRATION
Should the entire court system be put under the Supreme Court or
under a judicial commission, or council?
Or should it be left in separate organizations as at present?
II. NON-PARTISAN JUDICIARY
Is a non-partisan judiciary desired? If so, what method shall be,
used to secure one?
1. How should the judge be selected initially, by appointment or
by election?
2. If appointed, by whom, and from what list, and who will prepare such list?
3. How long shall the appointee serve-until the next general
election or balance of term for which appointed?
4. At end of his term shall he run against himself on his record,
or against some other candidate?
5. What shall be the test for elimination?
III. THE SUPREME COURT
All lawyers approach this court with kid gloves. Yet the committee will have to tackle it as vigorously as the justice courts, because it
radically needs reform. Whereas the Supreme Court of the United States
usually clears its docket annually, our court is two or more years behind
on many cases.
Its problem, as we see it, is two-fold-judicial and administrative.
. (A) JUDICIAL
How should the chief justice be selected, arbitrarily by seniority
(without regard to administrative qualifications), as at present, or be
elected by the other judges, or be appointed by the governor?
How long should he act as such?
Should districtjudges be subject to call to help clear the docket?
(B)
ADMINISTRATIVE
Should the justices be allowed to sit on national or state boards,
officiate in fraternal societies and churches, or be required to devote their
full time to their job as justices?
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Why is the court two or three years behind in its docket, and what
can be done to speed decisicns?
Should there be an annual report on the work of the court and of
each judge?
Should the court have an administrative officer to conduct the work
of the courts and keep statistics thereon?
IV. DISTRICT COURTS
There are fifteen judicial districts in Colorado. Denver, the more
populous districts, and the sparsely populated districts all have different
problems. Some of the judges are overworked, others have very little to
do. Judges outside of Denver are often better paid because they get
mileage and expenses.
Each district should be separately studied and then their work and
accomplishments be compared.
Here are some matters for study in these courts:
1. Should districts be rearranged?
2. If county courts are abolished, how many extra judges or districts should be added?
3. Should vacations be shortened?
4. Should jury cases be tried in summer?
V. COUNTY COURTS
There are 63 counties in Colorado. It is said that in 40 of them
the judges are laymen and not lawyers. Many of the counties have no
resident lawyers at all. Some of the county judges act as clerks of the
district court, so as to receive sufficient pay to be willing to act as county
judges.
A few of the queries which will arise under this head are:
Is the county court system satisfactory?
Should these courts be abolished and consolidated with the district
courts?
Should only their probate functions be transferred to district
courts?
Should their jurisdiction be reduced to $500.00 and should they
replace all justice courts?
In Denver should there be more than one county judge?
If abolished, initially should the lawyer members of the county
courts be transferred to the district courts until the expiration of their
terms?
Likewise if retained should present non-lawyer judges continue to
serve?
Warning: Any interference with these judges will meet real political opposition.
VI. JUVENILE COURTS
There is only one distinct juvenile court in Colorado. In some of
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the larger counties, county judges sit as juvenile court judges. The
Denver court is grossly overworked and the burden is steadily increasing.
Juvenile delinquency is a major problem of the day, for bench, bar,
parents, clergy, educators, police and the public.
What changes, if any, should be made in these courts? Some of
the suggestions are:
Have them entirely separate courts in the larger counties.
Have two judges in Denver.
Consolidate with district courts as branches thereof.
Should they be paid salaries or fees?
VII. JUSTICE COURTS
Very few of the justices are lawyers. In Denver their pay is only
$1,800 a year, and the charter properly, at that salary, allows them to
take private practice. None of the justice courts is a full-time job, and
a justice court is found in practically every town. Traffic cases have
become their main source of revenue.
Some of the thoughts under this head:
Are our present justices of the peace and their courts doing a satisfactory job?
Do we need as many as we have?
Would one justice court per county be etough?
Should their jurisdiction remain at $300.00 or be raised to
$500.00 or more?
Should they be paid salaries or fees?
Should they be consolidated with the county courts?
VIII. SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER STATES
(A) MISSOURI
Vacancies in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals and in the
Circuit and Probate Courts of St. Louis and Kansas City are filled by
the governor from a list of those names submitted by the non-partisan
judicial commission.
The Supreme Court may temporarily transfer judicial personnel
from one court to another as the administration of justice requires. It
elects the chief justice for four years. The term of office of the justices is
12 years.
There is a probate court in each county.
Justice courts are abolished. There is one magistrate court in each
county. Where there are less than 30,000 inhabitants the probate judge
is the magistrate. In counties of 30,000 to 70,000 there is one magistrate, and in those between 70,000 and 100,000 there are two magistrates, with one additional magistrate for each extra 100,000. The
counties with more than one magistrate are divided into nearly equal
magistrate districts. The magistrates are elected.
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Every judge and magistrate is required to be a lawyer, except that
probate judges in office when the constitution was adopted and former
justices who had held that office for four years are not required to be
lawyers.
(B)
WYOMING
There are no probate or county courts-the district courts act as
probate courts, and sit either as district or probate courts.
(C) OTHER STATES
The committee will study the judicial system in every state, in
Canada and Great Britain.
We want all the help and suggestions you can give us.

Notice Regarding Blue Cross Plan
The Denver Bar Association has made arrangements for the payment of Blue Cross dues to the secretary of the Denver Bar Association
at the same time that bar association dues are paid. Present Blue Cross
subscribers in the bar association group are paid through March 3 1,
1946. On or about April 1st these members will be billed for the
months of April, May, June and July by the Blue Cross office, these
dues to be paid to the Colorado Hospital Service at 810 14th St. After
April 1st dues for the bar association group will be collected annually
by the secretary of the Denver Bar Association and the amount of Blue
Cross dues for the annual payment will be included in the statement for
the bar association dues. In the event a Blue Cross subscriber wishes to
make any changes in his contract he should contact Donald M. Lesber,
secretary of the association. Any Denver Bar Association member under
the age of sixty-five years who is not now a member of the Blue Cross
may enroll now. Applications submitted to the secretary before April 1,
1946, will be accepted for coverage on May 1, 1946. The cost of the
plan is: for a single person, 75c per month, or $9.00 a year; for husband and wife, $1.25 a month, or $15.00 a year; for husband and wife
and all children under 18 years, $1.50 a month, or $18.00 a year.
The group will be open for enrollment again during the month of
June. All applications at that time must be in the hands of the secretary
before June 30th for coverage on August 1st, the anniversary date of the
group. After that time applications will be accepted only on the anniversary date of each year except for new members of the bar association,
whose application for Blue Cross must be in the office of the secretary of
the Denver Bar Association thirty days prior to the effective date of coverage, with the amount of dues for the remainder of the fiscal year.
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Nazi War Crimes and Criminalst
By COL. JAMES R. HOFFMAN*
In 1916, after much detailed research, I wrote an article for an
English class on "The Case Against Germany." One section was devoted to atrocities bcth against allied soldiers and against Belgian and
French civilians. In keeping with most Americans, many of us only
half-believed these accounts, or at least thought the stories to be exaggerated. As World War I became a dim memory and we began to bask
in the false sunshine of pacifism, thinking more of making dollars than
of insuring a permanent peace, we all considered the "case against Germany" as weaker and weaker, until finally Deutschland received a full
pardon with no strings attached.
The rearmament of Germany, the Munich Pact, the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, Poland, the low countries, France, are all history, yet
many Americans were not convinced of the criminal tendencies of the
Germans. Hitler's speech to his generals just before the Polish invasior
revealed the crime plan, "the invasion and extermination of Poland begins Saturday morning," with orders "to kill without mercy all men,
women and children of the Polish race or language," and the ultimate
aim to massacre all civilization except the pure "Aryans" or Nazi. On
December 17th of last year we who were on the Western Front of the
European theatre came face to face with stern reality and "the case
against Germany" became clearer and stronger, when we learned of the
Malmedy murders. Almost a hundred helpless American prisoners of
war lay dead on that Belgian snow-covered cross-roads, mowed down
by the machine guns of Nazi panzer troops. Since then the evidence has
been piling up until at last one of the blackest pages of all history lies
open, revealing that Germany, supposedly a highly cultured nation, was
in fact little better than a barbarous, uncivilized band of savages.
Immediately after V-E Day it was my good fortune to be assigned
as leader of a War Crimes Investigating team under the Judge Advocate's
Section of the War Department to inquire into Nazi war crimes. We investigated three principal types of atrocities, including crimes by German
civilians against American and British flyers who had been forced down
in enemy territory, crimes by military personnel and units against allied
soldiers, and crimes by SS, Gestapo and like organizations against political prisoners and other civilians.
The theory has been advanced that most atrocities were committed
by the fanatical SS and Gestapo, in spite of and without the approbation
of the rank and file of German civil population, but we found that the
tSummary of address before Denver Bar Association, January 7, 1946.
*Of the Denver bar.

DICTA
German housewife and over-aged artisan were just as bloodthirsty as
any elite guards and that when allied flyers were forced to bail out of
their B- 17, these civilians appeared eager to participate in the beating to
death of the helpless airmen with a monkey wrench or fence post, pelting
him with stones or running him through with a pitchfork, even after
he had been disarmed and made a legal prisoner. Many readily admitted
the deed and some even boasted of it.
Investigations revealed that in many instances the Germans showed
themselves to be past masters in the cruel treatment of prisoners of war.
Forced marches in freezing cold with little or no food, lack of medical
care, overwork under the most dangerous conditions, torture and even
murder, all in violation of the Geneva Convention, bring the Nazi into
the class of the prehistoric caveman.
Much has been said in the public press and shown on the screen of
Buchenwald, Belsen and Dachau. Our team had occasion to spend several weeks investigating one of the many concentration camps. We took
the testimony of witnesses, secured the evidence and exhibits and prepared the case against members of the SS, Gestapo and Organization
Todt who were in charge of the KZ and work lagers (camps) and labor
kommandos (details) and responsible for the construction projects.
Here we found starvation, beatings, murder, mass burials of political
prisoners, slave laborers and so-called "voluntary workers" from almost
every European country perpetrated by the SS, Wehrmacht, Gestapo,
Organization Todt and civilians. One who has never been near a concentration camp cannot imagine the stench and smell of death, the lice
and flea-infested, overcrowded huts, bodies piled by the thousands into
mass graves, living skeletons brought about by ersatz coffee and
"bunker" soup containing 700 calories, which will not sustain simple
life, much less give the energy necessary to work ten to twelve hours per
day at back-breaking toil under the constant threat of air SS whip or
OT club. A man's life expectancy, if he entered the camp in good
physical condition, was three months, and as the prisoners became too
weak to work, they were gassed, left to starve or freeze, or shot to death.
The lack of food, the beatings, the crowded, unsanitary conditions, the
absence of medical care, the agonizing cement columns and rock quarries
made life a living hell for these unfortunate people and reduced themn
from human beings to animals in their habits, thoughts and behavior.
Not only are the departments of Nazi government and those in
authority responsible for these crimes, but also the German people must
bear the everlasting stigma of their inhumanity to man. "The case
against Germany" has been proven beyond a shadow of a doubt.
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The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis
and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied
BY GEORGE T. EVANS*

Any examination of the doctrine of stare decisis is, inherently, a
study of judicial precedents. This is so because the doctrine itself is that
a distinct and solemn decision by a court or judge, made on a question
of law necessarily arising in a case is, to a high degree, binding authority
in subsequent cases in the same court, or in courts of equal or inferior
rank, when the "very point'

is presented for decision.

And when it is

said that the "decision" is binding, of course, it is the ratio decidendi,
or the principle, or the rule of law to be gathered from it, that is intended.
Where should the study of the doctrine of stare decisis begin? England at once suggests itself, because the importance of judicial precedents
has always been a distinguishing characteristic of English law. The unwritten or common law of England is, admittedly, only the accumulation of decided casem, going back in a series of reports from the present
day to and including the Year Books (1290-1535), in an almost continuous stream.
What other systems of law should be examined in this study of the
binding authority of precedent, this investigation of the development of
the doctrine of stare decisis? Not the Roman law, nor any of the modern
systems founded upon it, because, as is common knowledge, none of
these give any greater weight to judicial precedent than to other expressions of expert legal opinion. In those systems reports and text-books
are of equal significance. Both evidence the law and are, therefore, of
the same persuasive effect upon judge or court. Not so in England, however. An English precedent speaks with authority and is ordinarily to
be obeyed.
"We have been taught for ages that the glory of the common
law is the fact that it is built precedent upon precedent, like the
coral reefs, or a brick house, and that the common law, unlike the
Roman law, follows precedent rather than the writings of jurists."2
The English common law is often spoken of as "customary law."
But it would seem that such a description hardly fits the character of the
common law in England. There custom is not inevitably law and a
judicial precedent is not always mere evidence of the law. Sometimes it
is the law. A custom in England has no legal effect until it has been
found and declared by a court or judge, after which it is the decision
*Of the Denver bar.
Cohens v. Virginia (1821), 6 Wheat 257. 290.
'H. W. Humble, 19 Mich. L. R., 608, 612, 614.
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and not the custom that is the law. Thus, in England, a judicial decision
may actually create law, as where the judge or court finds and declares a
custom. Or an English judge or court may decide a case by virtue of a
custom which has, in a previous decision, been found and declared. In
the latter situation no law is created. The law of the older decision is
simply declared. Where a custom is found and originally declared by a
judge or court, the decision is law for the future. But where a prior
decision is merely applied by a judge or court in a given case, it is the
law of that case because it has been the law of the land since custom was
first transmuted into law by judicial determination and declaration.
Hence the importance and authority of judicial precedent, characteristic
of the law in England, as distinguished from the law in those countries
following the Roman law or civil code systems.
Upon what reason may be put the acceptance of mere judicial decisions in England, as sanctified statements of the law of the land? Why
is precedent so authoritative there? Entirely apart frorfi the universal
recognition by all mankind of the obvious advantages of permanency,
continuity and consistency, in similar circumstances of life, the answer
seems to be that the English royal judges have been, since ancient times,
a relatively small and compact body of legal experts, men of high professional standing, working together in harmony (in the larger sense of
the word) in the administration of justice in the royal courts, with such
skill and power as to engender at once the respect and acquiescence of the
people and the bar. Whenever it has been necessary for them to "fill in"
by decision a vacant space in the common law of England, their work
has been obediently accepted.
Before dusting off the ancient books and delving into the history of
stare decisis, another observation seems necessary as background. Judicial precedents and writing or printing are combined indissolubly. To
constitute a judicial precedent a decision must be susceptible of exhibition
and study. If it cannot be produced and examined it cannot be followed,
it can have no influence on the future action of judges and courts within
the contemplation of the doctrine expressed by the words stare decisis.
We turn, then, to the first attempts at reporting judicial decisions in the
English system. We go to the Year Books.
As a source of actual information on the development of the doctrine of stare decisis the Year Books are. disappointing. In his History
of JudicialPrecedent 3 T. Ellis Lewis shows that the Year Books do not
approach the modern concept of a series of reported decisions, but, on
the contrary, consist of notes made by students and practitioners of the
law concerning what they heard, observed and considered important
while in court; that names of litigants are often omitted; that, while
'Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 46, p. 207 and p. 341.
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account was taken of the facts and the points of law, nevertheless the
note-takers were more concerned with the debates, practice and procedure
than with the substantive law; that the judgment of the court was sometimes not written down; and that, altogether, it seems apparent that the
"reporters" did not intend that what they wrote should furnish any
guiding principles for posterity. But whatever their defects as a collection of reported decisions and however they may, themselves, fail to deal
with the authority of precedent and the development of the doctrine of
stare decisis, one item of importance is disclosed by our glance at the
Year Books. It is this: the very fact that the Year Books were compiled
at all indicates that the profession, even in those early times, recognized
the need of a record of the disposition of matters in the past, upon which
might be based action in the future, albeit the record was only personal
memoranda for the personal information of the man who took it down.
In view of the foregoing brief resume of the history of the attempt
at reporting judicial decisions in England during the period of the Year
Books, it seems safe to conclude that the rule of stare decisis had not
developed to a point where the term "doctrine" could in any proper
sense be applied to it during that time. However, we are certainly erititled to assume that where, despite the handicaps of the method then
currently followed for the preservation of decisions, a prior judgment
could, in some manner, be sufficiently proved to a judge or to a court in
a later case, where the question was the same, the innate common sense
of the later judges would prevent the flouting of the determination of
their predecessors. To that limited extent only may we say that the
doctrine of stare decrsis began to take shape before the advent of a reliable and accurate system of law reporting.
Professor Holdsworth tells us 4 that Sir John Burrow published in
1765 the first authorized series of decisions of particular courts in England, which approximated the modern standard. During the period
from the last of the Year Books down to Burrow's reports there were
published many so-called reports, but they were unauthorized and were
much like those in the Year Books-they were mere reproductions of
notes taken down for the private instruction of the writer. There was
one important improvement, however-written pleadings were coming
into use and thus the issues were clearly formed
and the decision on the
5
issue caught the attention of the note-takers.
Sir John Burrow's authorized reports, first published in 1765, undoubtedly put the judges of England in position to develop the doctrine
of stare decisis. The "mechanical" means to that end were then definitely
at hand. But we cannot fix 1765 as the starting point of the doctrine
'History of English Law, Vol. V, pp. 355-378.
5

1bid. 371.
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of stare decisis, for to do so would be to overlook perhaps its strongest
advocate, whose labors greatly facilitated its application, Sir Edward
Coke, who died in 1634. Coke's premise was that, "Out of the old
fields must spring the new corn,"6 and much of his writing is devoted to
deducing rules from the ancient authorities, explaining and reconciling
conflicting decisions and showing that the principles upon which the old
cases had been decided could be applied in his day and time. By thus
collecting, classifying and reconciling the old cases from the Year Books
and from the books of unofficial "reporters" who preceded him, Coke
put into the hands of the lawyers of that day an array of precedent,
which they were only too glad to cite as authorities in their own cases.
And out of this citing and following there dodbtless came into full life
the doctrine that we now call stare decisis. Of Coke and his work in this
behalf, Bacon said:
"Had it not been for Edward Coke's Reports, the law by this
time had almost been like a ship without ballast; for that the cases
of modern experience are fled from those that are adjudged and
7
ruled in former times."
Not overlooking such men as Burrow, Plowden, Byer, Yelverton,
Style, Rolles, Vaughn and many others who worked in this field, I
submit that Sir Edward Coke was the father of the doctrine of stare
decisis as it is known today.
In thus tracing the development of the instrumentation of the doctrine of stare decisis in England, we find that the necessity for adherence
to judicial precedent emerges again and again. It seems to have been
recognized from the very beginning of adjudicated cases in England
that the reasonable expectations of men, built upon the distinct and
solemn pronouncement of a judge or court should not be demolished at
the whim of any successor; and, that to permit such practice would ultimately cause law to lose its significance as a rule of conduct, making a
litigant's adventure in court akin to a journey into a wilderness of confusion. The constant and consistent effort at better reporting of decided
cases is strong evidence of the determination of the profession in England
to avoid such a situation.
Such was the "ancestry" of the doctrine of stare decisis, which by
Blackstone's time (1723-1780) was certainly fully fledged. Concerning
it he said:
"For it is an established rule to abide former precedents, where
the same points come again in litigation; as well to keep the scale
of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new
judge's opinion; as also the law in that case being solemnly de'1 Co. Rep. (Pref.).
'Spedding, Letters and Life of Bacon, Vol. VI, p. 65.
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clared and determined, what was before uncertain, and perhaps
indifferent, is now become a permanent rule which it is not in the
breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from according to
his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine not according
to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and
customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce new law but to
expound the old. * * *
"The doctrine of the law then is this: That precedents and
rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust; for though
their reason be not obvious at first view, we owe such deference to
former times as not to suppose that they acted wholly without consideration. * * *"8'
What of the development of the doctrine of stare decisis in the
United States? The plain answer seems to be that it came to these
shores fully developed with the colonists. Certainly it did not develop
here. And, as we have seen, it was in full operation in England before
the government of the United States was organized. It is simply one of
our many heritages from England.
To what extent should the doctrine of stare decisis be applied?
For an answer to this question we must leave the comfortable realm
of history and venture into the uncertain and boggy domain of theory
and speculation. And since, if this discussion is to have any practical
significance, it should deal chiefly with the application of the doctrine in
the United States, we will also quit England and come to this country.
These new theatres of operation do not, however, change the meaning
of the term stare decisis. As noted above, the doctrine may still be stated
to be that a distinct and solemn decision of a court or judge, made on a
question of law necessarily arising in a case, is, to a high degree, binding
authority in subsequent cases in the same court, or in courts of equal or
inferior rank, when the "very point" is presented for decision. In other
words, it is the teaching of the doctrine that the principle, or ratio
decedendi, of the prior decision is, ordinarily controlling on the same
point in later cases. Thus we are again inextricably involved with judicial precedents and, consequently, led irresistibly to a study thereof;
not, however, to learn of their history, as in the beginning, but to determine their authority.
Judicial precedents, when considered in relation to the doctrine of
stare decisis, seem to fall naturally into three classifications as follows:
(a) persuasive; (b) conditionally controlling; and, (c) absolutely controlling.
(a) Persuasive precedents: This classification may be exemplified
by decisions of courts of foreign countries and decisions of courts of one
'Cooley's Blackstone, 4 ed., Vol. I, pp. 70-71.
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state cited to courts in another state. Whether or not such decisions may
be said to come within the doctrine of stare decisis at all is, perhaps,
debatable. But, however that may be, it would seem that this group of
precedents may be dismissed here, with the observation that they should
be accorded only such authority as they merit, considering the courts
from whence they came, their appeal to reason, their age and the extent
to which they may have been relied upon, in dealings between man and
man, in the jurisdiction in which it is urged that they should be applied.
(b) Conditionally controlling precedents: This class differs from
persuasive precedents in that it does not include foreign decisions, nor
decisions from outside the jurisdiction where cited. Within it are what
might be called defective, junior, absolute precedents. Such are decisions
which, in the opinion of the court or judge to which they are cited, have
something wrong with them in reason, in law, or in both; and which,
coincidentally, have not by the passage of time and by their acceptance
and use by men, become so sanctified as to make adherence to them of
paramount importance. Thus a conditionally controlling precedent is a
decision which would be an absolutely controlling precedent, if it were
held to be sound enough, old enough and used enough at the time it is
under consideration. It might even be held absolutely controlling because of its age and use, although its soundness were doubted, if it had
become the basis of transactions in property, or contracts had been made
in reliance upon it. The interplay of the doctrine of stare decisis and
conditionally controlling precedents may, perhaps, be sufficiently illustrated by the following excerpt from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
for the majority of the Supreme Court, in a fairly recent case, where it
was said:
"We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social
policy. It represents an element of continuity in the law and is
rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations.
But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision * * * when such adherence
involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope,
intrinsically sounder and verified by experience. * I *
"Our problem is, then, not one of rejecting a settled statutory
construction. The real problem is whether a principle shall prevail
over its later misapplication,'"
I submit that the assignment of a precedent to this classification,
thus making the doctrine of stare decisis inoperative, is a most dangerous
proceeding and that such action should be taken by a court or judge only
after the most prayerful study, so highly desirable, indeed so imperative,
is stability in the law. It was Blackstone who said:
'Helvering v. Hallock (1940), 309 U. S. 119, 122; 84 L. ed. 604.
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"And it hath been an ancient observation in the laws of England, that whenever a standing rule of law, of which the reason
ptrhaps could not be remembered or discerned, hath been wantonly
broken in upon by statutes or new resolutions, the wisdom of the
rule hath in the end appeared from inconveniences that followed
innovation."0
(c) Absolutely controlling precedents: These precedents are the
very warp and woof of the doctrine of stare decisis. This is the class of
precedents that has become the basis of the ownership of property and
rights to property, upon the faith of which contracts have been made
and which, generally, may be said to have been relied upon in their dealings by me.n to such an extent and for so long a time that they are binding despite the contrary opinion of any subsequent court or judge. Their
effect is to deprive a subsequent court or judge of judicial discretion.
They are in the fullest sense binding. Within this class are decisions of
the highest court of a jurisdiction, as controlling in those courts of lesser
rank in the same jurisdiction; decisions of the highest court of a state on
a question of local law, concluding the Supreme Court on such a question; and, last but by no means of least importance, the prior decisions
of the highest court of any jurisdiction as binding on itself, in later cases
involving the "very point." It is this class of precedents that makes it
possible for men to "know" the law and to enter upon new adventures,
involving accumulations of capital (whether large or small), secure in
the knowledge that their plans will not be set awry by some later court
decision; that gives substance to the opportunity for the growth and
expansion of undertakings, where men follow a line of conduct marked
in advance by stabilized law; that, in short, culminates in business, employment, progress, prosperity and the ultimate good of the people and
the security of the nation. It is the very foundation of a government
which may be said to be one of laws and not a government of men. In
the field of constitutional law it is especially important, because there it
encourages and protects the weak, encourages and restrains the strong,
and circumvents the despot.
Concerning this type of precedent and its application in the field of
constitutional law, Mr. Justice White (later Mr. Chief Justice White)
said in a dissenting opinion:
"The rights of every individual are guaranteed by the safeguards which have been thrown around them by our adjudications.
If these are to be assailed and overthrown * * * the rights of property, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, are of little
worth. * * * The fundamental conception of a judicial body is
that of one hedged about by precedents which are binding on the
"°Cooley's Blackstone, 4 ed., Vol. I, p. 70.
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Court, without regard to the personality of its members. Break
down this belief in judicial continuity and let it be felt that on
great constitutional questions this Court is to depart from the
settled conclusions of its predecessors and to determine them according to the mere opinion of those who temporarily fill its bench
and our Constitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of value and
become a most dangerous instrument to the rights and liberties of
the people.""'
Perhaps no better statement of the importance of the doctrine of
stare decisis and the necessity for standing by absolute precedents, especially when the Constitution is involved, will ever be made.
On the general proposition of reverence for absolutely controlling
precedents, or, in other words, on the operation of the doctrine of stare
decisis, an early-day judge of a state court said:
"if the law, well established, may be annulled by an opinion,
a foundation is laid for the most reckless instability. The decisions
of one court may be overruled by another court, and those of the
latter will have only a transient efficacy, until some future court,
dissatisfied with them, shall substitute new principles in their place.
No system of inflexible adherence to established law can be as pernicious as such ceaseless and interminable fluctuations. -12
In conclusion, one more observation seems justified. It is this:
sometimes it is claimed that law is but the crystallization of social and
economic imperatives. This seems to be but another way of saying that
all law-that declared by the courts as well as statutory law passed by
the legislatures, state and national-is constantly in a state of flux, pulsating in rhythm to the impacts of supposedly irresistible social and economic forces. Such a view takes no account of the doctrine of stare decisis-the rule to the effect that courts and judges must be consistent;
that it is better that the law be established and certain than that it be
always undergoing a process of alteration in an attempt to do perfect
justice between all men at all times in conformity with social and economic trends currently discernible. Those holding the "social and
economic imperative" theory would cut the pattern to fit the cloth.
Those who hold with the doctrine of stare decisis would make the cloth
fit the pattern. These opposed philosophies seem to constitute the upper
and nether millstones of the judicial process in the United States, between which the courts must grind out a reasonable, fair and workable
system of law.
I submit, however, that, situated as we now are, in the midst of
social and economic conditions which can be nothing more than tempo'Pollock v. Farmers' L. El T. Co. (1895), 157 U. S. 427, 651, 652; 39 L.
ed. 759..
"'-osmer, C. J., in Palmer's Admr. v. Mead (1828), 7 Conn. 149, 157, 158.
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rary, and, faced as we now are with the uncertain and turbulent sea of
social and economic possibilities upon which we must embark in the
post-war era, we dare not cast away the ancient anchor of the law; we
must not abandon the doctrine of stare decisis; but, on the contrary, it
must be vigorously applied.

Help Wanted-Male or Female
Wanted-100 men and women to serve in state legislature. Must
be at least twenty-five years of age, citizens of the United States and the
State of Colorado. Must be honest, discrete, intelligent, able and personable. Must 'be well acquainted with all professions, businesses, industries and employments in the State of Colorado, including stock
raising, farming, mining, manufacturing, selling, financing, transportation and utilities. Must be intimately acquainted with all phases of
state government, departmental and institutional administration, personnel problems, the levying and collecting of revenue, economical and
efficient budgeting, public welfare, public health, education, the regulation of industry, the regulation of utilities, liquor, game and fish, highway safety, the commitment, care, treatment and restoration of dependent children, delinquent children, criminals, and the insane and feeble
minded, the preservation of natural resources, the construction and maintenance of highways and public buildings, and any other matter which
is or may become a proper subject for state legislation. Must have a
comprehensive knowledge of the laws of Colorado, including the Constitution, three volumes of statutes, eleven volumes of session laws, one
hundred and thirteen volumes of decisions of the supreme court, the
Constitution and laws of the United States, the common law of England as applied in Colorado and numerous published and unpublished
volumes of rules and regulations of various departments, boards, bureas
and directors. Should know the rules of interpreting and construing
statutes and should be able to perceive instantaneously the ultimate effect
of all words used in any proposed bill or amendment thereto. Should
know legislative procedure, administrative procedure and judicial procedure. Should know the problems of law enforcement. The term of
service is two or four years. Meetings are held in Denver once every two
years for from 90 to 150 days, and during this period must be prepared
to spend entire time in Denver and devote entire efforts to the responsibilities of position. During the remainder of term will be subject to call
at any time for any period of time. Will be selected by from 10,000 to
150,000 electors and before obtaining position must be prepared to interview these persons in groups of from 1 to 500 during the six weeks
period prior to selection. Must be willing to consult with any elector at
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any time on any question, public or private. Must be ready and willing
to answer questionnaires or all conceivable subjects, whether or not
related to state legislation, from any group now in existence or hereafter
created. Will be subjected to criticism whether justified or unjustified and
whether based upon fact, intelligent appraisal, or arising from prejudice
or incomplete understanding of the facts. Will be expected to anticipate
all problems which might arise in the future and find means of accomplishing the impossible, and overcoming conditions without the power
or facilities to do so. Will be expected to increase the service rendered
and yet reduce the cost to each individual contributing thereto. When in
session will be paid expenses in coming to Denver and returning home
once; however, during the session and at other times, will be expected
to make several trips between home and Denver at own expense. While
in Denver, will be expected to pay own living expenses. Will be subjected to some expense in seeking the position whether or not ultimately
successful in obtaining it. THE COMPENSATION REGARDLESS
OF TIME SPENT AND REGARDLESS OF EXPENSES INCURRED IS $1,000.00 FOR THE TWO YEAR TERM. Out of this
amount will be paid living expenses in Denver, traveling expenses for
trips to Denver in excess of one each session, and amounts spent in seeking the position. In computing income tax, the living and traveling
expenses, but not the expenses of seeking the position, are deductible. If
you are interested in such a position apply to the chairman of the County
Central Committee of your political party.
Denver Has Woman Bailiff
The Denver district judges have appointed Mrs. Bessie Bergman as
permanent bailiff of the criminal division of the district court. Mrs.
Bergman will also have duties as deputy clerk of the court. The creation
of the position of women's bailiff was made necessary by the recent
advent of women jurors in Denver courts.
District Attorneys Hold Annual Meeting
At the annual meeting of the District Attorneys' Association, held
in Denver in January, the following officers were elected:
President, Hatfield Chilson, Lqveland
Vice-President, Irl Foard, Colorado Springs
Secretary-Treasurer, Sam Nikkel, Cripple Creek
Retiring president is A. Allen Brown of Delta and the retiring
vice-president is Sidney Pleasant of Craig. The secretary-treasurer was
re-elected. The meeting was held in the Supreme Court chambers. Judge
Mortimer Stone, of the Supreme Court, spoke of the task of reconversion from the standpoint of the district attorney. Frank C. Dillon, Denver probation officer, spoke on the problems of probation.

DICTA

County Judges Hold Annual Meeting
At the annual meeting of the County Judges' Association, held in
Denver in January, the following officers were elected:
President, A. W. Dulweber, Fort Morgan
Vice-President, Christian D. Stoner, Golden
Secretary-Treasurer, C. M. Somerville, Hugo
Discussions were had of the problems of juvenile delinquency and
retirement compensation for judges. Committees were appointed to consider these matters and present to the legislature bills for greater penalties for parents whose children are delinquent and for a retirement compensation system for county judges. Judge William E. Buck, Boulder,
is retiring president.
Admitted to a Higher Court
Lionel Fisher, prominent Fort Morgan attorney,
heart attack in a Denver hotel. Mr. Fisher was city
Morgan, and deputy district attorney. He was active
matters. He was 44 years of age and is survived by a

died recently of a
attorney for Fort
in bar association
widow and child.

Upon Information and Belief
The newspapers contain lots of interesting information. The Association of District Judges of Nebraska have adopted standardized instructions to juries. This sounds like something that might have merit.
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, of Newark, N. J., former president of the
American Bar Association, dean of the New York University Law
School, one of the outstanding lawyers of the nation in the field of improvement of judicial administration, has called upon the colleges to
train men and women for political leadership. We certainly need something of this kind.
The New York State Bar Association has appointed a former newspaper man to handle public relations work for it. The bar's poorest
relations are its public relations.
The Wisconsin State Bar Association's board of governors has instructed its committees on integration and organization to draft a proposed set of rules for an all-inclusive, self-governing bar organization
and to submit the proposal to the board at its next meeting. In 1943 the
legislature provided for integration of the bar, but action was deferred
during the war.
A British court has had to determine which of two persons killed
in a bomb blast survived. This problem no lInger exists in Colorado by
reason of the Simultaneous Death Act passed in 1943.
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Constitutional Revision
Constitutional revision is receiving a lot of attention these days.
This year both Missouri and Georgia adopted new constitutions. Last
November New Jersey voters rejected a new constitution. In Tennessee
a commission is working on constitutional amendments to be proposed
to the 1947 legislature. New Hampshire's legislature adopted a resolution calling for a referendum on the holding of a constitutional convention. Constitutional reform was defeated or sidetracked in Kansas,
Florida and Alabama on the grounds war time is no time for constitutional change. Constitutional conventions were proposed this year in
California and Rhode Island, and in Texas a number of amendments
were voted on this year. In Illinois an effort is being made to amend the
constitution to allow easier amendment. In Kentucky the state bar is
sounding out opinion on constitutional reform. Perhaps, with the war
over, we may be able to give the subject more attention here in Colorado.
Courts
In August the voters of Texas approved a constitutional amendment which added the six commissioners of appeals to the Supreme Court
of three, making a nine man Supreme Court. Georgia this year increased
the Supreme Court from six to seven, and provided that the court should
elect its own officers. Iowa is considering abolition of the justice of the
peace. A New York senator is trying to get through in that state a plan
for the non-partisan selection of judges, based on the Missouri plan.
The governor of Missouri vetoed a bill increasing judges' pay. Then the
legislature began considering a plan to give judges retirement compensation. Longer tenure for judges was urged in Connecticut by a New York
judge. The bill before Congress increasing the salaries of federal judges
is receiving support from bar associations and other groups.
Administrative Procedure
Additional support is being given for the passage by Congress of
the McCarran-Sumners bill regulating federal administrative procedure.
This year California passed several bills regulating practice of state administrative agencies. On the other hand, a proposal of the Virginia
State Bar to restrict practice before the State Corporation Commission to
active members of the bar has been rejected by the commission.
Legislative Procedure
Representatives of the New York State Bar Association appeared
before the New York legislature to urge reform in legislative procedure.
This group urged a salary increase from $2,500 to $5,000 a year, and
that the legislature remain at work a larger number of days each week.
It also urged a bettering of the procedure within the legislature itself, if
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it is to regain its place in government as the policy-making body. Considerable criticism has been directed at Connecticut's legislative procedure
in connection with the proposal voted on this fall to provide for annual
rather than biennial sessions. The president of the North Dakota State
Bar Association has indicated dissatisfaction with the lack of interest in
legislation by the lawyers. Probably one of the greatest reasons for the
ascendency, in recent years, of the federal government, and the decline of
the states, is the failure of state legislative processes to keep up with the
times. Inadequate salaries and biennial sessions are only two of the many
things which are preventing legislatures from discharging their proper
functions. We might observe here that those who are really interested
in preserving states' rights would do well to make a real effort to improve
our state legislative processes.

Our Returning Lawyer-Veterans
Laurence Wheeler DeMuth, lt. col., Army Air Forces, served from
July 1941 to Jan. 1946 in the Training Command and Central Flying
Training Command. He was appointed to Command and General Staff
School and has numerous letters of commendation. He has returned to
the faculty of the Law School of the University of Colorado, Boulder.
He has also resumed his duties as adviser to the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association, and as
general secretary-treasurer of Phi Delta Phi.
Richard M. Davis, It. col., Air Transport Command, served from
Sept. 1942 to Dec. 1945. He served 24 months at headquarters of the
Air Transport Command in Washington and 13 months overseas in
the Asiatic-Pacific theater. He has the Bronze Star Medal, six battle
stars, and the Asiatic-Pacific service medal. He has returned to his positibn as a member in the firm of Newton, Davis and Henry, 215 Colorado
National Bank Bldg., Denver.
James Quigg Newton, Jr., commander, U. S. N. R.. served from
April 1942 to Dec. 1945 at headquarters of the Naval Air Transport
Service in Washington, as special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Air, and as member of the joint Army-Navy Air Transport Committee. He has the Navy Commendation ribbon. He has returned to his position as a member of the firm of Newton, Davis and
Henry, 215 Colorado National Bank Bldg., Denver.
Samuel M. Goldberg, major, Judge Advocate General Dept., served
from Nov. 1942 to Dec. 1945 as Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, Chief
Taxation Section, Seventh Service Command, Omaha. He has returned
to practice in his own office at 828 Symes Bldg., Denver.
Charles C. Nicola, lt., U. S. N. R., served from April 1942 to
Nov. 1945 at San Francisco, California. He has returned to practice in
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association with Ernest B. Fowler, 808 Ernest and Cranmer Bldg.,
Denver.
M. C. Garw6od, It. comdr., U. S. N. R., served from July 1942 to
Feb. 1946 in San Francisco, Washington, D. C., New York City, San
Diego and Okinawa. He is now associated with Home Builders, Inc.,
1725 California St., Denver.
Douglas McHendrie, captain, Army Air Corps, Office of Strategic
Services, served from May 1942 to Nov. 1945 in continental United
States. He has returned to his association with Grant, Shafroth & Toll,
730 Equitable Bldg., Denver.
Oval A. Phipps, It., U. S. Navy, served from 1943 to 1945 in the
Pacific area. He has the Purple Heart. He is now located in his own office at 509 E. V C. Bldg., Denver. He was admitted to the Colorado bar
in Jan. 1938 and had five years general practice before entering service.
He has an A. B. from Colorado University, 1932, LL. B. from Colorado University, 1938, and an LL. M. from Colorado University, 1938.
. Robert M. Gilbert, It., U. S. N. R., gunnery officer, served
from
Nov. 1942 to Nov. 1945 in Southwest Pacific area. He has returned to
practice in his own office at 230 Coronado Bldg., Greeley.
Harold Clark Thompson, It. col., Field Artillery, served from Dec.
1941 to Oct. 1945 in San Antonio and Dallas, Texas, and in New
York City. He was called to duty as a reserve officer in the Field Artillery
and was assigned to the military staff assigned to the Office of Civilian
Defense, where he helped organize civilian defense in the states in the
Eighth Service Command. During the last fifteen months of service he
was assigned to New York City as Industrial Protection Officer of the
Office of Civilian Defense for New York, New Jersey and Delaware, in
charge of a program which had as its purpose the protection of important industrial plants from fire, sabotage and accident. He has returned
to his position as director of claims, State Compensation Insurance Fund;
642 Capitol Annex, Denver. He was admitted to the Colorado bar in
1921. He has an A. B. from Colorado University, 1919, and an LL. B.
from the same school in 1921. He was assistant Attorney General of
Colorado, 1923-1924, deputy District Attorney, Denver, 1925-1926,
with Legal Salvage Dept., General Motors Acceptance Corp., 1927, in
general practice in Denver, 1928, and since 1929 has been director of
claims, State Compensation Insurance Fund.
Robert Daniel Charlton, colonel, Field Artillery, served from Feb.
1941 to Jan. 1946 in the United States, New Guinea and the Philippine
Islands. He commanded the 983 Field Artillery Battalion (155 mm.
guns-long toms) for approximately three years. This was formerly
the 2nd Bn. 168 Field Artillery, Colorado National Guard. This battalion participated in one operation in New Guinea, the Leyte invasion.
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Luzon invasion and the recapture of Mindanao. In the Luzon campaign
it assisted in the liberation of Bataan. The battalion had eleven months
of continuous operations in combat. Col. Charlton nded the war on
the island of Mindanao and received his final promotion while on terminal leave. He received the Bronze Star with an oak leaf cluster. He has
returned to practice as a member of the firm of Van Cise, Robinson and
Charlton, 602 E. 1&C. Bldg., Denver.
John F. Mueller, T/5, U. S. Army, served from March 1945 to
Dec. 1945 in the Staff Judge Advocate's Office at Camp Robinson, Arkansas, and at Fort Ord, California. He has returned to practice at 506
Midland Savings Bldg., Deaver. Mr. Mueller has been appointed by
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals as special master to refund
approximately six million dollars to natural gas consumers in Denver,
Pueblo, Colorado Springs, northern Colorado and Cheyenne.
Arthur Win. Krauss, colonel, Army Air Forces, served from March
1941 to Feb. 1946 in the Mediterranean area, Italy, and in the continental United States, southern and southwestern United States. He received
the Bronze Star Medal. He has returned to his former position with the
Standard Oil Company of Ind., Railway Exchange Bldg., Denver.
Ralph E. Waldo, Jr., lieutenant (s.g.) USNR, served from March
1942 to Sept. 1945. He served aboard the destroyer U. S. S. Case for
two years in the Southwest Pacific, engaging in carrier operations with
Task Forces 58 and 38 and bombardment missions most of that time.
He attended Gunnery School at Navy Yard in Washington, D. C., last
summer, during which time he was admitted to practice law before the
United States Supreme Court. He has returned to practice with his
father, R. E. Waldo, at 416 Greeley Bldg., Greeley. He was admitted
to the Colorado Bar in 1938 and had 3 1/2 years in private practice in
Greeley before entering the service. He has a B.A. and an LL.B. degree
from the University of Colorado, 1938.
John W. O'Hagan, sergeant, United States Army, served from Oct.
1943 to Nov. 1945 in the Southwest Pacific and Philippines. From
Feb. 1945 to July 1945 he was in the Judge Advocate's Office on Luzon
and was in the United States to attend Judge Advocate Officer Candidate
School, from which he resigned in September to return home. He has
returned to private practice with offices in the Greeley Building at Greeley. Mr. O'Hagan was formerly chairman of the Junior Bar Section of
the Colorado Bar Association.
L. B. Flanders, Jr., lieutenant, U. S. N. R., served from 1943 to
1945 in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific areas. He has now
returned to practke in the firm of Secor, McCarty &%
Flanders at Longmont.
Louis 0. Kelso, lieutenant, U. S. Navy, served from July 1942 to
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Dec. 1945 on the west coast in San Francisco, and Central America
where he was based at Balboa, Canal Zone. He received letters of commendation from the Commandant, Navy Yard, Mare Island, and the
Director of Naval Intelligence. He has returned to practice with the
firm of Pershing, Bosworth, Dick & Dawson, Equitable Bldg., Denver.
Roy C. Bloye, lieutenant, U. S. N. R., served from Oct. 1942 to
Jan. 1946 in the Central Pacific and in the Bureau of Ordnance in Washington, D. C. He received a letter of commendation from the Chief of
the Bureau of Ordnance. He has returned to his position as SecretaryTreasurer of the Denver Federal Savings and Loan Association, 719
17th St., Denver.
Louis E. Gelt, corporal, United States Army, served from April
1945 to Dec. 1945 in the continental United States. He has returned to
practice as a member of the firm of Gelt 1&Grossman, 617 Symes Bldg.,
Denver, which firm is in need of additional office space. Mr. Gelt has
been active in civic affairs in addition to membership in bar organizations. He is a member of B'nai B'rith and Z. 0. A. He is secretary of
the Denver Boy's Clubs, Inc., and he is a member of the Boy Scout Committee, Old Timers. He is a member of the Board of Guldman Community Center and of the Board of Directors of Young America League,
Inc.
Paul A. Ruston, captain, Air Corps, served from Dec. 1942 to Feb.
1946 in the American theater. He is deputy district attorney, West Side
Court, Denver.
Irving Howbert, lieutenant (j.g.) U. S. N. R., served from Feb.
1943 to Nov. 1945 on P.T. boats in the South Pacific, Solomon Islands,
New Guinea, and the Philippines. He has now returned to practice with
Haney & Haney, Mining Exchange Bldg., Colorado Springs.
Wilbur M. Pryor, Jr., lieutenant, U. S. Navy, served from June
1942 to Feb. 1946 in the United States and Okinawa. He is not presently located and is seeking an association with a law firm in Denver.
He was admitted to the Colorado bar in September 1941, and was associated with Remington Arms Company before entering the service. He
has an LL.B. degree from the University of Colorado, 1941.
Bernard E. Teets, It., U. S. N. R., served from March 1944 to
March 1946 in the Philippines, Okinava and Japan. He has returned
to his position as director of the Department of Employment Securily,
468 State Capitol Annex, Denver.
James B. Day, It., Naval Reserve, served from Sept. 1941 to Oct.
1945 in the Central and South Pacific and the Continental United
States. He received a letter of commendation from Commander of South
Pacific Forces for action in the battle of Santa Cruz in 1942. He is
practicing law at 429 University Bldg., Denver.
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Joseph L. Morrato, sgt., Army, served from Feb. 1944 to Sept.
1945 at Ft. Logan, Colorado, Army Induction Center, Mental Testing
Section, as assistant physiologist and personnel consultant. He is now
practicing law at 1916 13th St., Boulder. Mr. Morrato has an LL.B.
degree from Denver University in 1930. He was admitted to practice in
Colorado in 1930 and from that time up to the time of his entrance into
the army he was in general practice in Denver with Charles R. Enos.
J. Colin James, Jr., It., U. S. N. R., served from Jan. 1942 to
Jan. 1946 in Atlantic, Mediterranean, Caribbean and Pacific areas. He
has now returned to practice as a member of the firm of Davis, Klahr
and James, 714 Equitable Bldg., Denver.
Vance R. Dittman, Jr., chief petty officer, U. S. N. R., served from
Aug. 1942 to Sept. 1945 in Denver and Pueblo, Colorado. and in
Rome, Athens and Atlanta, Georgia. He has now returned to his position as associate professor of law at the University of Denver Law
School.
Shields Mason, captain, army, served in the Quartermaster Corps,
from March 1942 to Dec. 1945. He was Chief, Contract Claims Section, Legal Branch, Procurement Division, Office of the Quartermaster
General, Washington, D. C. He is not yet re-established in practice and
would like to have office space in an established firm or suite sharing
expenses with another attorney. Prior to entering the army he had
eleven years in general practice in both state and federal courts specializing in casualty and surety insurance law. He received an A.B. degree
from Colorado University in 1928 and an LL.B. from Denver University in 1930 and was admitted to practice in Colorado in 1931.
James R. Hoffman, colonel, army, served from Nov. 1940 to Jan.
1946. He commanded the 21st Armored Infantry of the 11th Armored
Division and served in the Third Army under General Patton. He served
in the European theater, Battle of the Rhine, Ardennes Battles and the
Battle of Central Europe. Since VE day he was assigned to the war
crimes branch of the Judge Advocate's Section of the War Department,
investigating and prosecuting Nazi war criminals. He received the combat infantry badge, three battle stars and the Purple Heart medal for
wounds received near Bastogne, Belgium. He does not yet have a permanent office and would like to have space in a suite on share-expense
and work arrangement. He is at present temporarily practicing from his
home at 2503 Dahlia St., Denver. Col. Hoffman was a second lieutenant
of Infantry in World War I. He received the degree of B.A. from Colorado University in 1923 and LL.B; degree from Colorado University
in 1922. He was admitted to practice in Colorado in March, 1923, and
from that time until his entrance into the army was in general civil practice in Denver.
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Newly Admitted Members of the Bar
I,n 1941 and 1942 the Colorado Supreme Court adopted two rules,
giving servicemen special benefits in admission to the bar. One of these
rules provides that any applicant who has taken a bar examination in
December, 1940, or subsequent thereto may, upon honorable discharge
from service, have two points added to his grade if such will bring his
grade to the passing grade of 75. The other rule provides that a graduate from an approved law school may be admitted to the bar without
examination if he has served in the armed forces. Under these two rules
the following persons have been admitted to the Colorado bar in the
1944
years indicated:
Richard George Luxford
Frederick M. Farrar
Andrew. Wysowatcky
0. M. Lloyd
1945
Carl Parlapiano
Wilbur F. Denious, Jr.
Walter John Predovich
W. Russel Eddy
James Henderson Rogers
Justin A. Gargan
Frank M. Scherer
John Edward Hyland
Benjamin F. Stapleton, Jr.
John Edward Morrison
Ernest 0. Tullis
Thomas W. Nevin

1946
Theodore B. Isaacson
Hyman A. Coggan
John La Guardia
Charles Fuller Cory
Arthur W. Prior
Harold R. Drake
Lon J. Putnam
Sidney Aaron Emeson
Sherman Arnold Sutliff, Jr.
Thomas B. Finn, Jr.
The following person has been admitted to the Colorado bar as a
result of the bar examination in June, 1945:
Minoru Yasui
The following persons have been admitted to the Colorado Bar as
a result of the bar examination in December, 1945:
Hunter Dumas Hardeman, Jr.
Elmer James Brittain
James J. Johnston
Bernice M. Buchler
Virgil Albert Lininger
H. Harold Calkins
Donald Carl McKinlay
Barkley L. Clanahan
Earl A. Wolvington
Mary Louise Yeager Duvall
William D. Wright, III
The following persons have recently been admitted to the Colorado bar on motion:
Gordon A. Nicholson
Eugene J. Coble
James F. Price
Woodruff Bryan Cram
William Van Stone Webb
Harold Edward Hafer
Leon Harvell
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